A Finding of No Infringement Against Amazon Does Not Extend to Trendyol’s Commitments, Turkish Competition Board Holds

DSM Grup Danışmanlık İletişim ve Satış Ticaret AŞ (“Trendyol”) applied for the removal of the commitments rendered binding on it in 2024 in relation to its automatic pricing mechanism, on the grounds that (i) the elements underlying the Turkish Competition Board’s (the “Board”) finding of no infringement in the Amazon Automatic Pricing[1] decision were equally applicable to its own case, and (ii) the commitments imposed on it were more onerous than those accepted in the Hepsiburada Automatic Pricing[2] decision.[3]

Upon examining the application, the Board:

• underlined that the commitment regime is applied on an undertaking-by-undertaking basis rather than on a file-wide basis, and that it is therefore not unusual for the same investigation to result in differing outcomes for different parties;
• emphasised Trendyol’s position in the market, while also noting that Amazon Turkey Perakende Hizmetleri Limited Şirketi (“Amazon”) and D-Market Elektronik Hizmetler ve Ticaret AŞ (“Hepsiburada”) had both completely discontinued the use of their automatic pricing mechanisms on their platforms; and
• found that, because Trendyol had not discontinued its mechanism, the competitive concerns within the platform persisted, and that the removal of the commitments was therefore not warranted.

The decision is significant in that it demonstrates that, even where undertakings’ conduct is highly similar in nature, that conduct is assessed on an individual basis, having regard to their respective market positions and the specific circumstances involved. In this context, the decision also establishes that a finding of no infringement issued in respect of one undertaking does not constitute a directly binding precedent for the commitments of another undertaking within the same investigation file.

The Board initiated an investigation to determine whether the automatic pricing mechanisms used by Hepsiburada, Trendyol and Amazon infringed Law No. 4054 on the Protection of Competition (“Law No. 4054”). The concerns underlying the investigation centred on the risk that the use of the automatic pricing mechanism could give rise to coordination among the prices of sellers operating in the online multi-category e-marketplace services market, and to the fixing of prices independently of the sellers’ free will.

The investigation was concluded in respect of Hepsiburada and Trendyol through commitments that were, to a large extent, similar in content and rendered binding on those undertakings. Amazon, by contrast, requested that the commitment process be terminated, stating that it would discontinue the use of the automatic pricing mechanism in Türkiye altogether. The Board decided that the investigation against Amazon should continue in the ordinary course, and at its conclusion determined that Amazon had not infringed Article 4 of Law No. 4054.

Shortly after the reasoned decision concerning Amazon was published, Trendyol argued, in essence, that:

1. no infringement had been found in relation to the automatic pricing mechanism despite Amazon not having submitted commitments;
2. under its own commitments, it was entitled to request that the commitments be reviewed or terminated prior to the specified term in light of changing circumstances;
3. all of the arguments relied upon in reaching the finding of no infringement in respect of Amazon were equally applicable to its own case, given that, under its mechanism as well, prices were displayed in full on a publicly accessible information screen and sellers could freely determine their prices in a manual field, with sellers wishing to take the buybox price into account being free to decide independently whether to compete at that price;
4. the automatic pricing mechanism was not a pricing or price-setting algorithm, but rather operated on the basis of prices determined by the sellers themselves; sellers made individual decisions without being aware of other sellers’ use of the feature or of the manual prices they had entered; and the mechanism was a free, optional alternative;
5. Amazon’s mechanism likewise contained a “match” rule, such that the two mechanisms were, to a large extent, similar;
6. the opinion of the Economic Analysis and Research Department had also indicated that the Trendyol and Amazon mechanisms operated in a similar manner, and that the number of sellers using the mechanism was low on both platforms;
7. although it had been subject to the same allegations, the commitments imposed on it were more onerous than those imposed on Hepsiburada, and it had been required to submit additional commitments;
8. one of the most significant differences was the requirement imposed on it to submit an independent auditor’s report; in the Hepsiburada decision, this difference had been explained on the ground that “granting external access to its systems could give rise to certain issues, and that access to Hepsiburada’s systems would expose strategically sensitive elements” — reasoning that, in Trendyol’s view, applied equally to itself; and
9. since it had been determined that the competitive concerns underlying the commitments were not present in the Amazon decision, the commitments it had submitted had become moot,

and on these grounds requested that its commitments be reviewed and removed.

In respect of Trendyol’s allegations and requests concerning Amazon, the Board found that:

1. the final decision issued in respect of each of the parties examined within the file had been reached through separate assessments conducted by the Board, such that it was likely for the commitment regime to produce different outcomes for parties within the same investigation;
2. the low rate of use of the mechanism by sellers, in respect of all three undertakings, did not exclude the competitive concerns that could arise,
3. although the mechanisms made available by the undertakings were similar in content and operation, the undertakings’ scale of activity in the multi-category e-marketplace market differed from one another;
4. the parties’ positions in the market and the competitive conditions they faced were not identical; it is not unusual in competition law for conduct that appears identical in nature to give rise to different anti-competitive effects for different undertakings; and the absence of a finding of infringement against Amazon did not require the same outcome for Trendyol or for other undertakings;
5. Amazon had completely discontinued the mechanism in Türkiye, such that the mechanism giving rise to the competitive concerns at issue in the file was no longer made available to sellers;
6. Hepsiburada had likewise completely discontinued the mechanism, and it had accordingly been decided that Hepsiburada’s commitments had become moot; and
7. the competitive concerns identified by the Board within Trendyol’s platform would persist for as long as the mechanism remained in operation,

and on this basis held that the decision issued in respect of Amazon did not automatically produce any consequence for Trendyol, and that the removal of the commitments was not warranted.

As regards Trendyol’s allegation that the commitments submitted by Hepsiburada had placed it at a disadvantage, the Board held that:

1. given that the scope and content of commitments vary on an undertaking-by-undertaking basis, a direct advantage-disadvantage comparison between undertakings is not possible;
2. Trendyol had submitted the additional commitments in pursuit of its own individual commercial interests, without regard to the other parties to the investigation; and
3. as regards the independent auditor requirement, the rationale that trade-secret algorithm details should not be disclosed to third parties had likewise been considered, and reasonably accepted, in respect of Trendyol.

The Board further considered that the obligation to report on compliance with the commitments through an independent auditor warranted separate assessment. The Board noted that the operation of Article 15(1) of Communiqué No. 2021/2 on the Commitments to be Offered in Preliminary Inquiries and Investigations Concerning Agreements, Concerted Practices and Decisions Restricting Competition, and Abuse of Dominant Position, which concerns the independent auditor requirement, had been stayed by the Council of State, and that Trendyol’s commitment text had been assessed in a process preceding that decision; it accordingly considered it reasonable for the commitments to be monitored and audited by Trendyol itself.

As a result, the Board rejected Trendyol’s request for the removal of its commitments, revising only the reporting obligation concerning compliance monitoring by removing the independent auditor requirement and providing instead that the report be submitted by Trendyol itself.

The decision confirms that the commitment mechanism is a procedural tool specific to each undertaking, independent of any finding of infringement, and that this characteristic requires the validity of commitments likewise to be assessed on an undertaking-by-undertaking basis. The fact that different outcomes have been reached within the same investigation does not automatically relieve a committed party of its obligations; such an assessment can only be made by reference to whether the competitive concerns identified in respect of the relevant undertaking remain current.

[1] The Board’s Amazon Automatic Pricing decision dated 18.04.2025 and numbered 25-15/348-164.

[2] The Board’s Hepsiburada Automatic Pricing decision dated 03.10.2024 and numbered 24-40/951-410.

[3] The Board’s decision dated 02.04.2026 and numbered 26-11/344-131.